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Bonn, June 2016 
Foreword to the fault type catalog 
Space software may contain faults. However, as faults onboard a spacecraft might develop into 
extremely costly software and system failures during a mission, every effort is made to remove 
faults before costly failures commence. One building block of prevention methods is to reduce 
the risk of occurrence of runtime errors through verification. 
There are numerous tools on the market that promise to detect many of the various faults that 
can cause failures at runtime of the software. Yet it is unclear, what the different tools can 
achieve in practice, and what tools to best apply to real-world space software. Will they be able 
to detect all the faults they promise to detect, and will they differ in their fault detection 
capabilities? What efforts are typically associated with verification using such tools?  
Therefore, the product assurance department of the DLR Space Administration initiated the ESVW 
project (“Evaluierung von Softwareverifikationsmethoden und –Werkzeugen”) under contract 
number 50PS1502, executed by BSSE Software and System Engineering and etamax space 
GmbH. The aim of the ESVW project was to develop and evaluate a technique for investigating, 
comparing and characterizing different software verification methods and tools in the context of 
space flight software. 
As part of the evaluation activities, software faults and the problem reports generated by the 
different tools had to be harmonized. In particular, the way how tools report findings differ quite 
significantly. We needed a mapping from reported presumable faults to actual faults and false 
reports, and a classification scheme for known faults. 
This technical report presents the detailed work results regarding the fault ontology and 
mapping. 
 
 
 
Dr. Christian Prause 
(Project manager of ESVW) 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
This document is published without any warranty or liability for its use or the information therein. 
The fault type catalog and its contents are the sole responsibility of BSSE, and do not necessarily 
reflect the opinion of the DLR Space Administration. The catalog does not present an exhaustive 
list. This document is distributed by the German Aerospace Center (DLR) under the terms of the 
Creative Commons CC BY-SA-2.0 license. 
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1. Introduction 
This document is an outcome of the ESVW activity (Evaluation of Software Verification Methods 
and Tools) and lists a set of known fault types and as such may be the basis for the categorisation 
of faults. 
The list is the result of previous experience, and may continuously be extended and/or modified. 
1.1. Terms and Definitions 
In the context of this report, the following definitions apply to the terms fault, error, failure, 
defect and bug (as used in ECSS-Q-HB-80-03A[2]): 
• An error is a bad or undesired state in a software system. 
• A fault is the cause of an error having its origin in the code, which may also be called a 
mistake. 
• A failure is a non-compliance regarding external behavior being recognized between 
expected and observed properties of the software product as a consequence of an error. 
• A defect commonly refers to troubles with a software product, with its external behavior 
or its internal features. This includes consideration of the risk of faults by potential 
changes of the context. 
• A bug is a synonym for a fault (as used by testers). 
Note that an error can be encountered either while abstractly reasoning about the software, e.g. 
in the context of the virtual semantics of a programming language, or during actual execution, 
e.g. on the intended target hardware or on some host system. 
From these definitions a chain of causality results as shown in Fig. 1-1. 
Term Scope 
Fault Mistake in code 
           ⇓                                    ⇓ 
Error Bad state of a system 
           ⇓                                     ⇓ 
Failure Unexpected observed behaviour 
Fig. 1-1 Causality Chain Fault, Error, Failure 
The term fault coverage describes the degree to which faults present in the software are or were 
detected or detectable in the course of the defined verification process. It is usually represented 
by the ratio of the number of faults recognised and the number of faults present, while the exact 
value of the latter is typically unknown and can at best be estimated. 
A fault type represents a set of faults which are grouped together due to common properties. For 
example, the fault type “buffer overflow” consists of all faults that result in write access beyond 
the defined bounds of a specific object in memory. 
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Note that the classification of faults according to fault types does not have to be unique: A fault 
may be a member of more than one fault type, and there may or may not be a hierarchy of fault 
types. For example, the mentioned “buffer overflow” fault type is a subset of the more generic 
“undefined result” fault type, which is defined as all faults that may lead to an undefined result 
as defined by the C-Standard, as well as of the “memory corruption” fault type. 
1.2. Verification Issues 
Today, standards such as ECSS, DO178 or EN 50128 require the definition of a verification 
process by which a software supplier shall demonstrate that the software has the required 
properties and in addition does not have undesired properties. 
Desired and undesired properties are usually expressed in the form of requirements. Some of 
these requirements address specific parts of the system or the code, while others are generic in 
nature, possibly applicable to every line of code. Examples for these generic requirements are the 
RAMS requirements on Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety. 
Such generic requirements are typically expressed in the form of generic rules, such as semantic 
constraints expressed in language standards, coding guidelines or other guides and standards 
which are mostly application-independent, but may be specific to the application domain (e.g. 
space, aviation, medical applications, etc.) 
One of the current approaches to demonstrate compliance between properties of a software 
product and requirements is to analyze the source code and to run tests, aiming to cover both, 
compliance and non-compliances. 
Due to the increasing amount of software, its increasing complexity and its criticality, verification 
tools –represetning another, complimentary approach – shall also help to decrease the effort and 
to increase the reliability of this process. 
It is next to impossible that a verification tool can identify all faults present, just based on the very 
generic definition of the term. Thus these tools are generally developed based on a set of generic 
rules, a violation of which usually indicates the presence of a fault.  
As a consequence, it seems reasonable to characterise verification tools by the fault types they are 
able to detect. 
In an ideal world, the capability to identify faults of a given type would imply completeness and 
correctness, meaning that a report about a fault is issued if and only if such a fault is present. 
Unfortunately, already theory suggests that at least one of genericity, correctness or 
completeness must be sacrificed. For example, it is impossible to devise an algorithm which can 
determine for any given program and any given input whether the program will terminate on 
that input, i.e. finish within finite time. This is the so-called Halting Problem. As a further 
consequence, it is impossible to derive an algorithm for a given non-trivial property that detects 
for any program provided as input whether that property holds for that program. A property is 
non-trivial as long as there is at least one program for which it holds and another program for 
which it does not hold. This result is known as Rice’s Theorem. 
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Practice further constrains the best capabilities to be expected from verification tools. Firstly, 
resource limitations – time, memory – may limit the accuracy of the analysis. Secondly, verification 
tools themselves are software products and thus may also contain faults. 
Thus, a verification tool may – for one or more reasons – fail to report a fault or may report a 
fault where no fault is present. There are 4 cases to be distinguished based on the actual 
presence of a fault and the presence of a report, as shown in Fig. 1-2, where green indicates the 
correct cases and red the wrong cases. 
 
 Code 
Defect present Defect NOT present 
Result 
Defect Reported true positive false positive 
Defect  NOT reported false negative true negative 
Fig. 1-2 Classification of Tool Reports on Faults 
 
The following abbreviations are used for the 4 cases: 
TP true positive 
FP false positive 
TN true negative 
FN false negative 
Fault coverage can be defined based on this classification as the ratio of true positives and the 
sum of true positives and false negatives. 
Sensitivity or recall – as used in information retrieval theory – is defined as the quotient 
TP/(TP+FN). It represents the portion of present defects that was identified by the analysis 
approach. A sensitivity of 1 thus indicates that all defects present were found. 
Precision is defined as the quotient TP/(TP+FP) and represents the portion of reported defects that 
are actual defects. A precision of 1 thus indicates that all defects reported were true positives. 
These relations are illustrated in Fig.  1-3. 
 
 
 
Fig.  1-3: Sensitivity and Precision 
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The actual number of unreported faults (FN) is unknown. In this activity, the number of FN has 
therefore been approximated by assuming that the overall set of actual defects (true positives, TP) 
reported by all tools and found during review of the reports represents the total set of defects 
present in the software, as illustrated in Fig.  1-4. 
This assumption is optimistic to the advantage of the tools as even in combination they may not 
find all relevant defects in the software. This means that the sensitivity figures derived from the 
analysis represent an upper bound on the actual sensitivity of the tools. 
 
 
Fig.  1-4: Identifying False Negatives by a Set of Tools 
 
 
Further, the number of false negatives (FN) can only be considered to address the defect types 
actually supported by the tools in combination. This means that – in the context of this evaluation 
– an unreported defect of any other type does not count towards the set of false negatives. 
 
The most critical case regarding software quality from a principal  point of view are false 
negatives, i.e. faults which are present, but not reported. These faults cannot be fixed due to lack 
of information about their existence. 
However, from a usability point of view, false positives may be just as devastating for software 
quality: If a tool produces too many fault reports, time and budget constraints may require to 
limit analysis of the reports to a subset. As it cannot be known in advance whether a report 
represents a true or a false positive, the subset may very well exclude reports about actual, critical 
faults. Such reports would therefore effectively become false negatives, just because they go 
unnoticed. 
Thus, while sensitivity may be high in theory, low precision may reduce the actual sensitivity 
encountered in practice, and this reduction and its amount may remain unknown. 
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2. Documents 
[1] ISO/IEC 9899: Information technology - Programming languages – C, 2011. 
[2] ECSS-Q-HB-80-03A 
. 
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3. Examples 
The following Tab.  3-1 provides – anonymized – examples of known faults and and Tab.  3-2 in 
some cases – correct – counter examples.  
All these examples were found in software in the past. 
Each of the fault types is assigned a main type and a subtype. For each fault type pseudo-code 
and an explanation is provided. 
3.1 Fault Examples 
 
Tab.  3-1 provides the observed fault types. 
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Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
1  Inconsistent 
Declarations 
and Uses of 
Functions 
Mismatch of 
Integer 
Parameter Types 
file1.c: 
int function(int); 
file2.c: 
int function(unsigned int) { 
  ... 
} 
This may result in an inconsistent interpretation of signed values. 
2   Mismatch of 
Parameter Count 
unsigned long inet_addr(); 
const char* server_name = ...; 
unsigned long host_addr = 
  inet_addr(server_name); 
inet_addr is defined as 
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp); 
while it was declared with zero parameters and called with one 
parameter. 
 
3   Mismatch of 
Enumeration 
Parameter Types 
common.h 
typedef enum { … } TyEnum1; 
typedef enum { … } TyEnum2; 
 
prototypes.h: 
#include “common.h” 
extern void func1(TyEnum1 para1); 
extern void func2(TyEnum2 para1); 
 
bodies.c: 
#include “common.h” 
#include “prototypes.h” 
 
void func1(TyEnum1 para1) { … } 
void func2(TyEnum1 para1) { … } 
The function func2 is declared to have a single parameter of 
type TyEnum2 in the header file, while the c-file contains a 
declaration giving TyEnum1 as the type for the single parameter. 
This violates the language rules in that two declarations for the 
same name – in this case func2 – exist, declaring the name to 
have non-compatible types (Clause 6.2.7, Paragraph 2 of the C-
Standard[1]). 
4   Mismatch of typedef enum {EMPTY,FULL} STATE; The parameters in the call to create are in the wrong order. 
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Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
parameter order 
in presence of 
enumeration 
types 
int create(int flag, STATE state); 
int id=create(EMPTY,0xff00ff00); 
However, the enumeration constants themselves are of type int 
(Clause 6.7.2.2, Paragraph 3 of the C-Standard[1]), and the 
enumeration type itself is compatible to char or a signed or 
unsigned integer type (Clause 6.7.2.2, Paragraph 4 of the C-
Standard[1]). 
The parameter values are assigned to the parameters (Clause 
6.5.2.2, Paragraph 4 of the C-Standard) and therefore implicitly 
converted to the declared parameter type. 
The mix-up of parameters therefore does not violate any semantic 
rule of the C-Language. 
5  Unreachable 
Code 
Code following 
unconditional 
jump-statement 
return; 
break; 
The code after the jump-statement clearly is not reachable. 
However, it cannot be concluded whether the jump-statement 
itself or the code following it is wrong. 
6   Retained test 
statement 
errCode=SUCCESS;    // TEST !!!! 
if (errCode==ERROR) { 
} 
A statement inserted for test purposes was not removed. This is 
often used to force specific parts of the code to be executed that 
under development conditions are difficult to reach. Typically this 
addresses error handling code, which either is forced to be entered 
or forced to be skipped this way. 
7   Branching based 
on function 
returning 
constant value 
if (myfunc(para)==0) ... 
else ... 
If myfunc either always or never returns 0 according to its 
specification, the condition here is constant, and thus either the 
then- or the else-part is unreachable. 
8   Tautological 
condition 
void func(int a, int b, int c) { 
  if (a*b>=c || c>a*b) { 
The else-part of the if-statement is never reached, as the 
condition represents A || !A and therefore is always true. 
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Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
    ... 
  } else { 
    ... 
  } 
} 
9  Uninitialised 
Data 
Uninitialised 
Index 
typedef struct { 
  int id[10]; 
} TyDBEntry; 
void func(TyDBEntry *db) { 
  int i,j; 
  printf(“Id:%d\n”,db[i].id[j]); 
} 
The variables i and j are used before being initialised. As they 
are declared in block scope, their value will be undefined, leading 
to a possible invalid memory access. 
10   Conditional 
initialisation 
void flash(int id) {  
 char str[100],msg[1000]; 
 switch (id) { 
  case XXX: strcpy(str,“defined”); 
  default: // nothing 
 } 
 sprintf(msg,”msg=%s”,str); 
} 
If the value of id is not one of the handled cases, the contents of 
str remain undefined. As a result, the call to sprintf may lead 
to accessing invalid indices of of str and writing beyond the end 
of msg. 
11   Uninitialised 
Pointer 
char *fn; 
void myfunc() { 
 if ((fd = fopen(fn,”a”)) == NULL) 
 { 
    ... 
 } 
Here, the global variable fn is not explicitly initialised, but passed 
to fopen. 
Flagging this as a defect may lead to a false positive on 
subsystem- or system-level if there is an initialisation function that 
initialises fn properly before myfunc can be called. 
. 
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Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
} 
12  Unfulfilled or 
unchecked 
contract 
Wrong return 
value 
File ctrlInit.c 
int ctrlArr[4]={1,1,1,0}; 
 
File ctrlVal.c 
extern int ctrlArr[]; 
int funcCreatePtr 
(char **ptr, int ind) { 
  if (ctrlArr [ind]) 
  { 
    *ptr=getStrPtr(); 
    return SUCCESS; 
  } else 
    return SUCCESS; 
} 
 
File ctrlExec.c 
int funcCreatePtr(char** ptr, int ind); 
char *ptr=NULL; 
if (ERR==funcCreatePtr(&ptr,3)) 
  exit(99); 
else 
  strcpy(ptr,”xxx”); 
The (implicit) contract of funcCreatePtr allows the function to 
return SUCCESS only if *ptr was properly initialised. However, 
funcCreatePtr always returns SUCCESS, so that the code in 
ctrlExec.c will never enter the then-part of its if-statement and 
may exhibit a write access to a NULL-pointer via the call to 
strcpy. 
The passing of a wrong return value in general is a functional 
defect, but its consequences may lead to runtime errors. Therefore 
there may be faults in this type which are easily detected by various 
generic methods, while others may only be detectable using 
application-specific review and test. 
13   Unchecked Index void resetTime(int sub,  
               int status, 
               int activity) { 
The (implicit) contract specifies that activity may not be 
outside the bounds of the array execTime. 
The fulfillment of the contract can be easily checked by 
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Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
  switch (sub) { 
  case XXX: 
    execTime[activity].tv_sec = 0; 
    break; 
  } 
} 
resetTime itself. 
14   Unchecked 
length 
typedef struct TyMsg { 
  unsigned char msgLen; 
  char msgData[128]; 
} TyMsg; 
char buf[128]; 
void handleMsg(TyMsg* msg) { 
  memcpy(buf, 
         &msg->msgData[0], 
         msg->msgLen); 
} 
The value of msgLen is expected to be no more than 128, but 
this is not checked, leading to two possible out-of-bounds 
conditions, one by reading beyond the end of msgData, the other 
by writing beyond the end of buf. 
This could be avoided by checking msgLen inside handleMsg. 
15   Implicit 
correlation 
between 
pointers 
void func(char* start, char* stop) { 
  char* ptr; 
  for (ptr=start;ptr<stop;ptr++) { 
    ... 
  } 
} 
The parameters start and stop are implicitly correlated in that 
they should refer to the same array object and that stop should 
refer to an element of that array not before that referred to by 
start. 
The first condition is impossible to be checked by standard C 
constructs. The second implies stop>=start, which can be 
checked, but is not a sufficient condition for fulfilment of the 
contract. 
16   Assumption #define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 1200 uint8_t* inputBuffer; In the function processByte it is assumed that inputBuffer 
. 
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Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
about length of 
buffer 
size_t inputIndex; 
uint8_t byteFromLastCall; 
int foundBOM; 
 
int receiveMessage(void* msg, 
                   int32_t* bytesRecvd) 
{ 
  inputBuffer = (uint8_t*)inMsg; 
  while(isDataReady()) { 
    uint8_t c = getByteFromStream(); 
    if(processByte(c)) { 
      *bytesRecvd = inputIndex; 
      return 1; 
    } 
  } 
  return 0; 
} 
 
int processByte(uint8_t byte) { 
  uint8_t prevByte = byteFromLastCall; 
  byteFromLastCall = byte; 
 
  if(byte==MARK) { return 0; } 
 
  if (prevByte==MARK) { 
    switch (byte) { 
    case EOM: 
      foundBOM = 0; 
      return 1; 
    case BOM: 
      foundBOM = 1; 
      inputIndex = 0; 
      return 0; 
    case ESCAPE: 
      if(foundBOM) { 
        inputBuffer[inputIndex] = MARK; 
        if (inputIndex<MAX_MSG_LENGTH-
1) 
points to a buffer of at least MAX_MSG_LENGTH bytes. Whether 
this is the case can only be determined from the contexts in which 
processByte and receiveMessage are called. 
. 
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Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
                inputIndex++; 
      } 
      return 0; 
    } 
  } else { 
    inputBuffer[inputIndex] = byte;    
    if(inputIndex < MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1) 
      inputIndex++; 
 
    return 0; 
  } 
} 
17   Implicit 
correlation 
between data 
and code 
typedef struct TyCmdDescr { 
 unsigned int cmd; 
 unsigned short minLen; 
 unsigned short maxLen; 
} TyCmdDescr; 
TyCmdDescr cmdDescr[ ]={ 
  {cmd1,3,10}, 
  …  
}; 
char buffer[65532]; 
 
void recvCmd(char        *cmdData, 
             unsigned int offset, 
             unsigned int entry) { 
 unsigned short len; 
 memcpy(&len, 
            cmdData+offset, 
            sizeof(len)); 
In this example, the length passed to memcpy in execCmd may 
become much greater than 65532, if len is less than 3. The result 
of len-3 may become negative, and by way of integer conversion 
may be interpreted as a very (large) unsigned integer. 
The (implicit) contract seems to contain a requirement towards 
the caller of execCmd to ensure that the len is not less than 3. 
The caller – in this case recvCmd – ensures the fulfillment of this 
requirement by checking the length against a length derived from 
a table. 
Changes to cmdDescr may introduce violations of the contract. 
However, from a design point of view, this requirement does not 
have to be part of the contract or at least could be easily checked 
by execCmd. 
Further, the implicit contract contains a requirement that the 
buffer pointed to by cmdData must be large enough to fit the 
data of the length given by len-3 (assuming len>=3). 
. 
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Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
 if (len >= 
cmdDescr[entry].minLen) 
  execCmd(cmdData,offset);         
} 
void execCmd(char        *cmdData, 
             unsigned int offset){ 
 unsigned short len; 
 memcpy(&len, 
            cmdData+offset, 
            sizeof(len)); 
 memcpy(buffer, 
            cmdData+offset+sizeof(len), 
            len-3); 
} 
This cannot be checked or enforced by standard language means. 
Passing the size of the buffer pointed to by cmdData would help 
verification at the lower levels, but the correspondence between 
given and actual size would have to be enforced elsewhere. 
18  Access out of 
array range 
Terminating 0 of 
string not 
considered 
const char cstr[]=”12345678”; 
typedef enum {false,true} 
 Boolean; 
void func() { 
  char vstr[8]; 
  Boolean bool; 
  strcpy(vstr,cstr); 
} 
The variable vstr is declared as an array of 8 char elements, 
while the constant string in cstr consists of 9 char elements, 
including the terminating 0. The call to strcpy therefore results in 
a buffer overflow. 
The result is highly architecture-dependent. The placement and 
order of the relevant bytes of bool in memory depends on the 
alignment requirements and the byte order of the platform. 
The compiler is free to chose the integer base type used to 
represent the enumeration type Boolean ([1], Clause 6.7.2.2). 
In the first two cases, the compiler may even decide not to store 
bool in memory at all, if register usage allows and no address of 
19  const char cstr[]=”12345678”; 
typedef enum {false,true} 
 Boolean; 
void cpyfunc(char vstr[8]) { 
. 
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Main Fault 
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  strcpy(vstr,cstr); 
} 
void func() { 
  char vstrloc[8]; 
  Boolean bool; 
  cpyfunc(vstrloc,true); 
} 
bool is taken anywhere in the function func. 
Different variants with varying degrees of locality of the 
information relevant for detecting this defect are given. 
20  const char cstr[]=”12345678”; 
typedef enum {false,true} 
 Boolean; 
char vstr[8]; 
Boolean bool; 
void func() { 
  strcpy(vstr,cstr); 
} 
21   Invalid array 
length 
#define SIZE 500 
int i,j,arr[SIZE],result; 
for (i=0;i<SIZE;i++) 
  for (j=0;j<SIZE;j++) 
    result=arr[i+j]; 
In this case it is obvious at multiple points during the execution of 
the loops, the index will be out of range, most specifically during 
the last iteration of the outer and inner loop (i+j==2*SIZE-2). 
According to the C-Standard, the value of result after execution of 
the loops is therefore undefined. 
The example is iterated in the source code for matters of tool 
evaluation. 
22   Invalid Index #define QUEUE_SIZE 10 
#define BUFFER_SIZE 1024 
typedef struct TyQueue { 
In this part of an implementation of a ring-buffer, an out-of-
range-condition may occur in the expressions queue[head-1], 
namely after a wrap-around of the ring-buffer, with the buffer not 
. 
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  unsigned int start; 
  unsigned int len; 
} TyQueue; 
unsigned int head=0; 
unsigned int tail=0; 
unsigned int next=0; 
bool    full=FALSE; 
TyQueue queue[QUEUE]; 
char    *buffer[BUFFER_SIZE]; 
 
void storeQueue(char *data, 
                unsigned int sz){ 
  if (head!=tail || full==TRUE) { 
 next=queue[head-1].start +  
           queue[head-1].len; 
  } else { 
      next = 0; 
  } 
  if ((next+sz) < BUFFER_SIZE){ 
    queue[head].start=next; 
    queue[head].len  =sz; 
    memcpy(buffer+next,data,sz); 
    head++; 
    if (head >= QUEUE_SIZE) 
      head=0; 
    if (head == tail) 
      full=TRUE; 
being full. 
This can happen if elements from the start of the ring-buffer are 
being processed and removed, while the buffer is constantly filled 
and nevery becomes completely empty in the process. 
. 
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  } 
} 
23   Invalid size 
passed to 
memcpy due to 
signed/unsigned 
mixup 
#define MAXLEN 128 
typedef struct TyMsg { 
  char msgLen; 
  char msgData[MAXLEN]; 
} TyMsg; 
TyMsg theMsg; 
char buf[MAXLEN]; 
void getMsg(TyMsg* msg); 
 
getMsg(&theMsg); 
memcpy(buf, 
       &theMsg.msgData[0], 
       theMsg.msgLen); 
The signedness of char is implementation-defined (Clause 6.2.5, 
Paragraph 15 of the C-Standard[1]). 
In an implementation where char is signed, a data element of 
128 bytes – the maximum value allowed here – would be 
represented by a value of 128 in msgLen, which would be 
interpreted as -128. 
Passing this as the third parameter of memcpy would imply an 
implicit cast to size_t, an unsigned integer type. Therefore 
memcpy would interpret the length given as the maximum value of 
size_t minus 127 (Clause 6.3.1.3, Paragraph 2 of the C-
Standard[1]), which would usually represent at least the size of the 
address space minus 128. 
The example is iterated in the source code for matters of tool 
evaluation. 
24   Buffer Overflow 
in Structure 
typedef struct { 
  char buf[20]; 
  char marker; 
} TyRecord; 
void func(TyRecord* record) { 
  record->buf[20]=‘A‘; 
} 
The array access writes beyond the space allocated to buf. 
However, the memory written to is accessible as well, and the 
access will thus not raise an exception, which makes detection 
difficult. 
25   One-off size 
calculations 
#define LEN 10 
char myChArr[LEN]; 
The 0 is written into invalid memory (out-of-range). 
. 
Title: ESVW-TN-FTC-001 - Fault Type Catalog  
Version: 1.0, June 2016 
                                                         Page: 23 
 
 
 
 
Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
myChArr[LEN]=0; 
26   One-off size 
calculations 
typedef struct{ 
   size_t source; 
   size_t length; 
} TyQueueEntry; 
 
TyQueueEntry queue[MAX_QUEUE_SIZE]; 
char buffer[MAX_BUF_SZ]; 
unsigned int head, tail; 
unsigned int full; 
 
TyResult write_data(void* data, 
                    size_t data_len) 
{ 
  unsigned int start; 
  unsigned int space_avl; 
  TyResult     result; 
    
  if((head != tail) || full!=0) 
     start =  
       queue[head - 1u].source + 
       queue[head - 1u].length); 
  else 
     start = 0u; 
   
  if((MAX_BUF_SZ-(data_len-1u))< start) 
The call to memcpy can lead to a one-byte-overflow in buffer. 
The reason for this is the -1u in (MAX_BUF_SZ - (data_len - 
1u)) < start. If start is MAX_BUF_SZ +1-data_len, this 
condition will be false and the data will be written into buffer 
starting at start, with the last byte being written at index 
MAX_BUF_SZ. 
. 
Title: ESVW-TN-FTC-001 - Fault Type Catalog  
Version: 1.0, June 2016 
                                                         Page: 24 
 
 
 
 
Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
     start = 0u; 
   
  if(head==tail && full==0) 
     space_avl = MAX_BUF_SZ; 
  else 
     space_avl = 
       (queue[tail].source – start) % 
       MAX_BUF_SZ; 
 
  if(space_avl >= data_len) 
  { 
    memcpy(&(buffer[start]), 
           data,data_len); 
    if(full==0) 
    { 
      queue[head].source = start; 
      queue[head].length = data_len; 
      head++; 
      if (head==MAX_QUEUE_SIZE) 
        head = 0; 
      if(head==tail) 
        full = 1; 
      result = ok_data_queued; 
    } 
    else 
      result = nok_queue_full; 
  } 
. 
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  else 
    result = nok_buffer_full; 
  return result; 
}      
27   Wrong index 
value 
#define NUM_ELEMS 4  
typedef enum {FALSE ,TRUE   } TyBool; 
typedef enum {NOSUCC,SUCCESS} TyStatus;  
TyStatus OSfunc(int threadId); 
TyBool elemList[NUM_ELEMS]= 
    {FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE};  
void myFunc(){  
  int      elemId=0, freeElem = -1;  
  TyBool   free_elem_found = FALSE; 
  TyStatus status;  
  while ((free_elem_found == FALSE) && 
         (elemId < NUM_ELEMS)){  
    if (FALSE == elemList[elemId]){  
      freeElem         = elemId;  
      elemList[elemId] = TRUE;  
      free_elem_found  = TRUE;  
    }  
    elemId++;  
  }  
  if (TRUE == free_elem_found){  
    status = OSfunc(elemId);  
    if (status!=SUCCESS){ 
The function given here shall find an unused entry in elemList, 
marked by the value of the entry being FALSE. The entries in 
elemList represent threads available to process jobs. 
Once such an entry is found, it is marked as used and an 
operating system function OSfunc is called to wake up the 
relevant thread. This function may return an error. If so, the 
original entry is intended to be freed again. 
However, the function contains a functional error in that not 
original entry is set to FALSE, but rather the entry following it. 
This is due to the fact that instead of freeElem, which is 
assigned the index of the element to be used, elemId is used as 
index when resetting the entry. Before exiting the loop, the 
statement incrementing elemId is being traversed once again, so 
that after that elemId points to the element after freeElem. 
This functional defect only violates language rules when only the 
last entry of elemList is FALSE. In that case, the reset would 
access the element behind the end of the array, but only if the 
operating system function returns an array. 
. 
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      /* error handling */  
      elemList[elemId] = FALSE;  
    }  
  }  
  return;  
} 
28   Wrong size void copy(int dest[20], int src[20]) { 
  memcpy(dest,src,sizeof(src)); 
} 
This will not copy 20 integers, as possibly expected, but rather 
only as much bytes as are required to store a pointer to integer. 
Parameters of array type are demoted to parameters of equivalent 
pointer type. Thus the type of src is not “array of 20 integers”, 
but instead “pointer to integer”. 
29   Missing table 
termination 
typedef struct { 
  unsigned char id1; 
  unsigned char id2; 
  ... 
} TyEntry; 
#define INVALID_ID 0xFF 
TyEntry pkttab[TABLEN]={ 
  {0,0,...}, 
  {0,0,...}, 
  {0,1,...}, 
  {1,0,...}, 
  {1,2,...}, 
  {1,2,...} 
}; 
Here, a table is iterated in three levels. The table contains entries 
grouped by two identifiers, id1 and id2. The middle loop is 
intended to iterate over consecutive entries with common id1, 
and the inner loop shall iterate over consecutive entries with 
common id1 and id2. 
For this, three index variables, idx1, idx2 and idx3 are used. 
The inner loop increments idx3, which is then used to forward 
idx2, which in turn is used to forward idx1. Only the outer loop 
contains a check for validity of idx1. 
Thus at some point the state will be such that the inner loop is 
entered with id1=1, id2=2, idx1=4, idx2=4 and idx3=5. The 
loop condition holds, so idx3 is incremented. 
The loop condition is checked again, by accessing the element 
. 
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#define TABLEN 6 
unsigned int idx1 = 0; 
unsigned int idx2 = 0; 
unsigned int idx3 = 0; 
unsigned char id1, id2; 
while(idx1<TABLEN) { 
  id1 = pkttab[idx1].id1; 
  id2 = INVALID_ID; 
  while((pkttab[idx2].id1== id1) && 
        (id2 != pkttab[idx2].id2)) { 
    id2 = pkttab[idx2].id2; 
 
    while((pkttab[idx3].id1 == id1) && 
          (id2 == pkttab[idx3].id2)) { 
      ...    
      idx3++;                
    } 
    idx2 = idx3; 
  } 
  idx1 = idx2; 
}       
with index 6 - which is beyond the end of the loop. 
This can be avoided by adding a terminating entry to the loop, 
with id2==INVALID_ID, or by checking for the end of the table 
(idx2,idx3<TABLEN) in every loop. 
30  Malformed 
logical 
expressions 
Assignment 
instead of 
comparison 
void func(int *a, 
          int b, 
          int *c, 
          int d) { 
  if (*a=b && *c=d) { 
The condition contains assignment operators instead of equality 
comparison operators. 
As the logical-and operator has higher precedence than the 
assignment operator, the expression is equivalent to *a=(b && 
(*c=d)). 
. 
Title: ESVW-TN-FTC-001 - Fault Type Catalog  
Version: 1.0, June 2016 
                                                         Page: 28 
 
 
 
 
Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
    ... 
  } 
} 
If b is zero, the value of *c remains unchanged, *a is assigned 0 
and the body of the if-statement is not entered. 
If b is zero, d is assigned to *c. The body of the if-statement is 
entered if and only if d is non-zero. 
31   Assignment 
instead of 
comparison 
int x; 
x=...; 
if (x=1 || x=2) ... 
else ... 
The variable x is always assigned 1 leading to the else-branch 
never being executed. The second part of the disjunction is never 
evaluated. 
32   Conditional 
Initialisation due 
to short-circuit 
code 
int func1(); 
char* ptr; 
if (func1()==0 || 
    (ptr=malloc(40))==NULL) { 
  ... 
} 
strcpy(ptr,”something”); 
The call to malloc shall serve to initialize ptr, but if func1 
returns 0, malloc will not be called. 
33   Condition 
depending on 
pointer values is 
constant 
#define LOG_FILE_PATH "ramd:/logdir/" 
if (LOG_FILE_PATH == NULL) { 
  ... 
} else { 
  ... 
} 
As two constant string pointers are compared to each other, the 
result of the comparison is constant as well. This means that either 
the then- or the else-part is dead code. 
Most likely, the then-part will never be reached, as the string is 
not expected to be stored at address 0. 
34   Condition 
depending on 
function pointer 
is constant 
void myfunc(int); 
if (myfunc==0) ... 
else ... 
The then-part of the if-statement is never executed, as myfunc is 
the address of a function and therefore constant and not NULL. 
Possibly, the condition should have read myfunc()==0. 
. 
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35   Comparison of 
floating point 
values for 
equality 
int func(float p, float q, float x) { 
  if (x*x+p*x+q==0.0) { 
    return 1; 
  } else { 
    return 0; 
  } 
} 
Floating point arithmetic is – independently of the precision of the 
floating point type – prone to numerical inaccuracies. Therefore, 
direct comparison for equality seldomly is appropriate. 
36  Duplicate 
Declarations 
Data declaration 
without 
intialisation 
File myFile1.c 
int multiDecl; 
File myFile2.c 
int multiDecl; 
 
The C-Standard allows declarations with the same name to exist 
in different compilation units (Clause 6.2.2 of the C-Standard[1]). 
The concept of linkage exists to decide whether these refer to the 
same object. Names declared with external linkage refer to the 
same object also across compilation unit boundaries. Names 
declared with internal linkage refer to the same object only within 
a compilation unit. 
A name can be declared at global to have internal linkage by 
adding the storage-class specifier static. Sometimes, this 
addition is forgotten, leading to the name referring to the same 
object, although it was originally intended to refer to different 
objects in different compilation units. 
During the linking process usually this can only be detected if at 
least two of the declarations also contain an initialisation of the 
object. In that case the linker will have to report an error. In all 
other cases, no language rule is violated, although the defect may 
have consequences for the semantics of the code. 
37   Data declaration 
with initialisation 
File myFile1.c 
int multiDecl=0; 
File myFile2.c 
int multiDecl; 
 
38   Incompatible File file1.c: The variable declarations for enumVar refer to the same object, 
. 
Title: ESVW-TN-FTC-001 - Fault Type Catalog  
Version: 1.0, June 2016 
                                                         Page: 30 
 
 
 
 
Id 
Main Fault 
Type 
Fault Subtype Example Explanation 
Declarations typedef enum { 
  value1 = 0, 
  value2 = 1 
} TyEnum; 
TyEnum enumVar; 
File file2.c: 
typedef enum { 
  value1 = 1, 
  value2 = 2 
} TyEnum; 
TyEnum enumVar; 
as they have external linkage. The C-Standard[1] requires the types 
to be compatible, which in case of enumeration types means that 
constants of the same name also must have the same value(Clause 
6.2.7, Paragraphs 1f). However, as the compiler will not see 
file1.c and file2.c at the same time, and usually no 
information is output to the linker about the enumeration-
specifiers, this inconsistency cannot be detected. 
39  Format String 
Issues 
Using „%s“ for 
an integer 
parameter 
int a; 
printf(“%s\n”,a); 
Not only is the behaviour undefined, but may also lead to read 
accesses from invalid adresses if the value of a does not contain a 
zero byte. 
40   Too many 
arguments 
int a, b; 
printf(“%d\n”,a,b); 
The output might be intended to list the value of b as well. 
Otherwise, this is non-critical. 
41   Too few 
arguments 
int a; 
printf(“%d:%s\n”,a); 
The output is invalid, and in case a string is expected, this may 
lead to invalid memory access. 
42   Signedness 
Mixup 
char c; 
printf(“%u\n”,c); 
The output is intended to be unsigned, with c representing a byte 
value (0-255). However, the type char may be signed 
(implementation dependent), in which case it is cast to int before 
passing it as argument to the variable argument list, resulting in a 
value in the range UINT_MAX-127 to UINT_MAX or 0 to 127 
being output. 
. 
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43  Macro Issues Multiple 
statements in 
one macro 
#define XY stmt1; stmt2 
 
if (COND) 
  XY; 
The programmer expects both statements to be conditional, while 
only the first actually is. 
44   Side-effects in 
macro 
parameters 
#define MAX(a,b) ((a)>(b)?(a):(b)) 
char func(char* ptr, int x, int y) { 
  int max = MAX(x++,y); 
  return ptr[max]; 
} 
The expression x++ will be evaluated twice if the original value of 
x is larger than that of y. Otherwise, x++ will be evaluated only 
once. 
45   Redefiniton of 
the language 
#define return ; Here the semantics of the keyword return are changed 
drastically. 
46  Dereferencing 
invalid pointers 
NULL-pointer 
access 
(conditional 
initialisation, 
unconditional 
use) 
int Day(time_t myTime)  
{ struct tm *myLocalTime;  
  myLocalTime = localtime(&myTime);  
  if(myLocalTime ==NULL)  
     printf(„no conversion\n");  
  return myLocalTime->tm_mday; 
}  
Here, the return value of localtime may be NULL, which is 
checked for in the if-statement. However, the return statement can 
be executed even myLocalTime is NULL, leading to an invalid 
memory access. 
47   NULL-pointer 
access 
(unconditional 
initialisation, 
unconditional 
use) 
char *str; 
str=malloc(100); 
str=0;//should be *str=0; 
... 
strcat(str,”xyz”); 
The pointer is initialised instead of the area it is pointing to. 
Apart from that, another fault is present as the return value of 
malloc() is not checked. 
48   NULL-Pointer int flashRead(int fd, In this example, fileSizePtr is initialized to NULL in the 
. 
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Access 
(unconditional 
initialisation, 
conditional use) 
              size_t offset, 
              void* dest, 
              size_t size); 
 
unsigned long fileSize; 
if (COPY_FROM_FLASH == copy_mode)  
{ unsigned long *fileSizePtr = NULL;  
  if (flashRead(flashIO, 
                offset+totalBytes, 
                (void*)fileSizePtr, 
                sizeof(unsigned long)) 
      == ERROR)  
  { //error reading file size}  
  else  
  { //success reading file size  
    fileSize = *fileSizePtr;  
  } 
}  
beginning. The call to flashRead() cannot change that. 
Therefore fileSizePtr is still NULL when entering the else-part 
of the if-statement, leading to an invalid memory access. 
49   NULL-Pointer 
Access 
(conditional 
initialisation, 
unconditional 
use) 
void fullName(const char *path, 
              const char *fn, 
              char *ffn){ 
 if (path == NULL) 
    strcpy(ffn, fn); 
 else 
    sprintf(ffn,”%s/%s”,path,fn); 
} 
The case fn==NULL is not considered. 
. 
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50   realloc 
without pointer 
update 
void func1(int* ptr, size_t sz) { 
  ptr=realloc(ptr,(sz+1)*sizeof(int)); 
  ptr[sz] = 1; 
} 
void func2(size_t sz) { 
  int* ptr = malloc(sz*sizeof(int)); 
  ... 
  func1(ptr, sz); 
  free(ptr); 
} 
If realloc cannot grow the original memory block to the 
desired size, a new memory block is allocated, the data is copied to 
the new block and the old block is freed. 
As func1 does not give the new address of the block back to 
func2, func2 may use an outdated pointer to access that 
memory block and to free it. The memory block may already have 
been reused in an intermediate call to malloc. 
51   Access via invalid 
pointer 
(!=NULL) 
int* ptr = ...; /* not NULL */ 
int i = 10; 
while (i>0) { 
  *ptr = i; 
  ptr++; 
  i--; 
} 
The pointer may point to an invalid address space or to the wrong 
object. 
52  Name 
Overloading 
Type and 
variable names 
struct xy { 
... 
} xy; 
In the C-Language, the tags of struct, union and enumeration 
specifiers reside in a namespace separate from that in which other 
names – such as those of variables – are listed. The struct in this 
case can always be accessed unambiguously by struct xy, while the 
variable is referred to by xy. 
However, this impacts readability and thus also verifiability. 
53  Pointer 
Arithmetic 
Arithmetic on 
pointer to void 
void* myBase=...; 
void* ptr=myBase+4; 
The C-Standard[1] only allows pointers to complete object types 
as operands to additions or subtractions for pointer arithmetic 
. 
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or function type (Clause 6.5.6, Paragraph 2). Function types are not object types in 
general, and void is not a complete object type. 
Compilers might still generate code for such an operation, with 
undefined result, as the size of void or function types is not 
defined. 
54   Unchecked 
conversion from 
int to pointer 
int func(int a) { 
  return *(int*)a; 
} 
The information, that the argument actually represents an 
address in space, is hidden. 
Also, it is not guaranteed that int is wide enough to represent a 
pointer. Instead, the C-Standard provides intptr_t for that 
(Clause 7.20.1.4 of the C-Standard[1]). 
55  Missing return 
for non-void 
function 
Conditional 
return 
int func(int a) { 
  if (a!=0) { 
    return 1; 
  } 
} 
If a is zero, the value of the function call expression is undefined 
(C-Standard[1], Clause 6.9.1, Paragraph 13). 
56  Non-
Termination 
Endless loop void func(unsigned int step, 
          unsigned int limit) 
{ 
  unsigned int i; 
  for (i=0;i<limit;i+=step)  
    ... 
} 
The loop will never terminate if para is zero. 
57   Endless 
Recursion 
File fault.h 
void verifyFault(int ind); 
The function handleFault may be conditionally called 
recursively, without termination, if ind is not handled by any of 
. 
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void handleFault(int ind); 
 
File verify.c 
#include <fault.h> 
void verifyFault(int ind) { 
  switch (ind) { 
    case 0: ...; 
    case 1: ...; 
    default: handleFault(ind); 
  } 
} 
 
File verify.c 
#include <fault.h> 
void handleFault(int ind) { 
  switch (ind) { 
    case 0: ...; 
    case 1: ...; 
    default: handleFault(ind); 
  } 
} 
the cases in the switch-statements. 
58   Unintented 
Number of 
Loop Iterations 
unsigned int  itemUsed[..],cc,i; 
int           fc; 
int setItem(unsigned int); 
fc = setItem(cc); 
itemUsed[cc] = fc; 
for(i=1;i<itemUsed[cc];i++) { 
Critical cast between signed and unsigned if setItem returns -
1, if e.g. the value of cc is invalid. Then the upper limit of the 
loop is UINT_MAX instead of -1 which generates a quasi-endless 
loop. 
. 
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  ... 
} 
59   Unintented 
Number of Loop 
Iterations 
void myFunc(int lower, int upper) 
{ 
   int i; 
   if ((upper-lower)>100) 
 return; 
   for (i=lower;i<upper;i++) 
       ...; 
} 
As per the C-Standard, the result of the subtraction in the if-
condition may be undefined, as it may not fit into an int. 
However, compilers do generate code that usually uses modulo-
arithmetics. 
Using the minimum int value for lower and the maximum int 
value for upper will lead to (upper-lower)==-1. Although 
this value is less than 100, the loop will iterate a large number of 
times, e.g. 232-1 times in case of an 32-bit integer type. 
60   Iteration 
statement not in 
loop body 
void repeat(char* s, int n, char c) { 
  int i = 0; 
  while (i<n) 
    s[i]=c; 
    i++; 
  s[n]=0; 
} 
The programmer obviously forgot the curly braces to delimit the 
body of the while-loop. As a result, the increment expression is 
not part of the loop, and if 0<n holds in the beginning, the loop 
will be entered and never terminate. 
61  Arithmetic 
Errors 
Overflow 
allowed by C-
Standard 
void func(short a, short b) { 
  unsigned short c; 
  c=a * b; 
  if (c>10) { 
  } else { 
  } 
} 
The operations in this example are valid and well-defined 
according to the C-Standard[1]. However, the multiplication may 
lead to an overflow, which in turn may lead to unintended results. 
Both operands to the multiplication are first implicitly promoted 
to int, as all values of type short fit into int (Clause 6.3.1.1, 
Paragraph 2 of the C-Standard[1]). The result of the multiplication 
therefore also is of type int. 
As the values of the two operands are constrainted to the range 
. 
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of short, the result of the multiplication will fit into the range of 
int, so no exceptional condition in the sense of Clause 6.5, 
Paragraph 5 of the C-Standard[1] occurs during the multiplication 
itself. 
During simple assignment, the value of the right operand to the 
assignment is converted to the type of the left operand (Clause 
6.5.16.1). In this case, int is converted to unsigned short. 
In case the result does not fit into the range of unsigned 
short, it is converted by repeatedly adding or subtracting the 
maximum value of unsigned short plus one to or from the 
value (modulo arithmetic, Clause 6.3.1.3, Paragraph 2 of the C-
Standard[1]). 
62   Overflow during 
operation 
void func(unsigned short a, 
          unsigned short b) { 
  unsigned short c; 
  c=a * b; 
  if (c>10) { 
  } else { 
  } 
} 
While only slightly different from the previous example in that the 
input parameters are of type unsigned short instead of 
short, in this example, the result is undefined, as the result of a 
multiplication of values in the range of unsigned short do not fit 
into the range of int (C-Standard[1], Clause 6.5, Paragraph 5). 
Typically, compilers do generate code for this case, with the result 
being determined in a similar way as in Example 61. 
63   Overflow during 
assignment 
void func(short a, short b) { 
  short c; 
  c=a * b; 
  if (c>10) { 
  } else { 
This example differs the previous examples in that the result is 
stored in a variable of type short instead of unsigned short. 
The result is undefined because the result of the multiplication of 
the two variables may exceed the range of short (Clause 6.3.1.3, 
Paragraph 3 of the C-Standard[1]). This is different from conversion 
. 
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  } 
} 
to unsigned short. 
64   Division by zero int func(int a, int b) { 
  return a/b; 
} 
The value of b may be zero. 
65   Square root of 
negative number 
float solve(float a, float b, float c) 
{ 
  return (-b + sqrt(b*b-4*a*c))/(2*a); 
} 
The value passed to sqrt may be negative. 
66  Type 
Inconsistencies 
const qualifier 
in pointer 
declarations 
#ifndef UNITTEST 
const 
#endif 
unsigned int *dest=<init value>; 
memcpy(dest,src,len); 
Here, a warning should be issued related to discarding the const 
qualifier in passing dest as first argument to memcpy, as that 
argument is declared to be of type void* (without const). 
This example – as most of the others – has been found in actual 
code. The switch seemed to be intended to make certain objects 
writable during unit test. However, to make dest itself constant 
instead of the objects it points to, the declaration would have to 
read: 
unsigned int * const dest=...; 
67   Inconsistency 
between array 
type and array 
initializer 
int actl[4] = {0,1,0,0,1,1}; The array is declared to contain only 4 elements, but is initialised 
with 6. This seems to violate the rule that no initialiser shall provide 
a value for an object not contained in the entity being initialised 
(Clause 6.7.9, Paragraph 2 of the C-Standard[1]). 
68  Functional 
defects 
Wrong 
operator 
int func(short i, short j) { 
  return i*j; //should be + 
In this function a functional defect is present in that the 
function was thought to calculate the sum of its two parameters, 
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} but instead calculates the product. 
Clearly, this code does not violate any rules that the correct 
implementation would not also violate (most specifically the rule 
that the result of an arithmetic operation must fit in the result 
type, here int). 
Therefore this defect can only be detected either by unit tests 
where the output of the function is verified, or due to fault 
propagation, e.g. when the result is used as an index in a calling 
function. 
69   Comparison 
instead of 
assignment 
void func(int x) { 
  int y; 
  y==x; 
} 
The expression statement contains comparison operators instead 
of assignment operators, and thus has no effect. 
70  Implicit 
Conversions 
 #define BUFLEN 256 
void func(unsigned short s) { 
  unsigned char buf[BUFLEN]; 
  size_t buffer_index = 0; 
  buf[buffer_index] = s; 
  buffer_index += sizeof(s); 
} 
Judging from the index increment, the intent is to write the value 
of s into consecutive bytes in buf. 
Due to implicit conversions taking place during assignment, only 
the least significant byte of the value of s is actually stored. The 
value of the following byte is undefined. 
71  Undefined 
Result 
Shift operation Unsigned short funcShift16(int 
width,int pos,int val){ 
  int bitPos; 
  int shifts; 
  int mask; 
The intention of funcShift16 is to place the value val at a 
certain bit-position in a window of width bits (1..16) within a 16-
bit word. In consequence, the range of shifts is -15..15. The 
result of the shift-operation is undefined if shifts <0.  
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  unsigned short word; 
  unsigned short mask; 
  mask  =((1 << width) -1) << pos; 
  bitPos=pos % 16; 
  shifts=16-(bitPos+width); 
  word &=~mask; 
  val  =val << shifts; 
  word|=val & mask; 
  return word; 
} 
72  Missing return 
for non-void 
function 
No return at all int func(int id) { 
  int ret=0; 
  switch (id) 
  { 
    case 0:  ret=0; break; 
    case 1:  ret=1; break; 
    default: ret=4; 
  } 
} 
The function should return a value. 
73  Malformed 
logical 
expression 
 int myfunc(int arr[],int arrSize,int 
id) 
{ 
  int ii=0; 
  while (ii<arrSize & arr[ii]!=id) 
    ii++; 
  if (arr[ii]>0) 
The & should be &&. However, the while-loop is correctly 
executed, yielding a value of arrSize for ii when leaving the 
while-loop when id is not found in arr. In this case an out-of-
range condition occurs for the following if. 
As & in contrast to && is not subject of short circuit code, arr is 
also accessed with index arrSize, and an out-of-range condition 
occurs. 
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    arr[ii]=-arr[ii]; 
  return ii; 
} 
 
 
74    int myfunc(int arr[],int arrSize,int 
id) 
{ 
  int ii=0; 
  while (arr{ii]!=id && ii<arrSize) 
    ii++; 
  return ii; 
} 
If id is not found in arr an out-of-range condition occurs in the 
while -expression because the check on arrSize is performed 
after the access of arr. 
75  Run-Time Fault Division by zero double myDivZeroFuncDblErr(double x) { 
  double ret; 
  ret =1.0/(x*x-9.0); 
  ret+=1.0/(x*x); 
  return ret; 
} 
double myDivZeroFuncDblBound(double x) 
{ 
  double ret; 
  ret=1.0/(x*x-9.0); 
  ret+=1.0/(x*x); 
  return ret; 
} 
int myDivZeroFuncIntErr(int x) { 
  int ret; 
This set of functions shall check whether a division by zero will be 
detected, for floating-point and integer. 
The postfix Err indicates that the function is called with the critical 
values (0 and 3), while the functions with postfix Bound are only 
called with safe values (1,10). 
Polyspace should detect that for the Bound-functions no error can 
occur. 
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  ret =10000/(x*x-9); 
  ret+=10000/(x*x); 
  return ret; 
} 
int myDivZeroFuncIntBound(int x) { 
  int ret; 
  ret =10000/(x*x-9); 
  ret+=10000/(x*x); 
  return ret; 
} 
76  Run-Time Fault Sqrt on negative 
number 
double mySqrtNegDblErr(double x) { 
  double ret; 
  ret=sqrt(x*x-20*x+1); 
  return ret; 
} 
double mySqrtNegIntBound(double x) { 
  double ret; 
  ret=sqrt(x*x-20*x+1); 
  return ret; 
} 
 
This set of functions shall check whether square root of a 
negative number will be detected. 
The postfix Err indicates that the function is called with critical 
values (1 and 3), while the functions with postfix Bound are only 
called with safe values (100,200). 
77  Dereferencing 
invalid pointers 
(contd.) 
NULL-pointer-
access in 
seemingly dead 
code 
static int counter = 0; 
 
void func() { 
  if ((counter & 1) == 0) { 
    counter++; 
The else-part of the conditional statement is clearly reachable, 
and contains an access to a NULL-pointer. 
However, a tool considering only the initial value of the global 
variable may assume that the else-branch is unreachable, and thus, 
that the invalid null-pointer access is irrelevant. 
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  } else { 
    char* ptr = NULL; 
    strcpy(ptr,”something”); 
  } 
  ... 
} 
78   Unchecked 
return value 
(localtime) 
#include <time.h> 
 
int getdayofmonth() { 
  time_t t = time(NULL); 
  struct tm* loc = localtime(&t); 
  return loc->tm_mday; 
} 
localtime() may return NULL in case of an error[1]. In that 
case, the indirect member access would constitute a runtime error. 
79   Unchecked 
return value 
(malloc) 
#include <stdlib.h> 
 
char* getdigitsstr() { 
  char* s = malloc(sizeof(char[11])); 
  strcpy(s,”0123456789”); 
  return s; 
} 
malloc() may return NULL in case of an error[1]. In that case, 
the pointer access would constitute a runtime error. 
80  File Handling Invalid argument retFclose=fclose(fd); 
if (feof(retFclose)==0) 
Invalid argument passed to feof and access of file descriptor after 
fclose 
 
1.  The return value of fclose is passed to feof instead of the file 
descriptor 
2. The file descriptor is passed to feof after fclose. 
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In this case the file descriptor is considered undefined. 
81  File Handling Read invalid data 
from file 
fgets(buf,BUFLEN,fd); 
divByZero=atoi(buf); 
quot     =100 / divByZero; 
fgets(buf,BUFLEN,fd); 
negSqrt  =(double)atof(buf); 
result   =sqrt(negSqrt); 
Data read from file are invalid, e.g. division by zero and sqrt on 
negative number 
 
82  Array access Out-of-range int ESVW_func82_2(int *para){ 
 for (ii=0;ii<20;ii++) 
} 
int ESVW_func82_1(int *para){ 
  ret=ESVW_func82_2(para); 
} 
int arr[10]; 
ESVW_func82_1(arr82); 
An array is passed to a function expecting a pointer, which in turn 
calls another function expecting a pointer. In latter function the 
pointer is accessed with an invalid index w.r.t. to the boundaries of 
the arry passed. 
83  Array access Out-of-range typedef struct TyMyStruct { 
  int items; 
  int item[ITEM_NO]; } TyMyStruct; 
int myFunc(uint8 *buf, uint8 bufLen, 
TyMyStruct *myStruct){ 
  if (buf==NULL || myStruct==NULL) 
  ret=-1; 
  else { 
    if (bufLen<1) 
      ret=-2; 
    else { 
A buffer, a corresponding length and a structure are passed to a 
function which shall copy the logical elements of the structure 
from the buffer. In C the allocated memory and the passed length 
cannot be correlated. In the example the contents of the buffer is 
inconsistent with the passed length. The number of elements 
provided in the first byte of the buffer is larger than the what the 
buffer actually contains. Further, the check on the passed length of 
the buffer is faulty so that a buffer overflow will occur even if the 
check is successful. In this example no assumption is made on the 
context. 
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      start=0; 
      items=buf[indBuf];  
      indBuf+=1; 
      if (items> ITEM_NO) { 
        items= ITEM_NO; ret=-3; } 
      myStruct->items=items; 
      ind=0; 
      while (items>ind) { 
        memcpy(&myStruct->item[ind], 
               &buf[indBuf], 
               sizeof(int)); 
        ind++; 
        indBuf +=sizeof(int); 
      } 
    } 
  } 
 
  return ret; } 
84  Array access Out-of-range extern int myFunc(uint8 *buf, uint8 
bufLen, TyMyStruct *myStruct); 
void myFuncContext() { 
  uint8 buf[5]={10,0,0,0,0}; 
  uint8 len=sizeof(buf); 
  TyMyStruct myStruct; 
  myFunc(buf,len,&myStruct); 
} 
In this example we embed the function of example 83 into a 
context provided by function myFuncContext. 
. 
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85  src too small Out-of-range #define NAME_LENGTH_85 30 
char dest85[NAME_LENGTH_85]; 
char name85[] = "xxxx_xx_xxxx"; 
memcpy(&dest85[1],name,NAME_LENGTH_85 - 
1); 
      //   29      13           29 
A standard length for names is defined and used for copying. 
However, an array is passed which does not have the standard 
length as it is implicitly defined by an initializer. 
The array is passed as pointer across function boundaries. 
Therefore the smaller length is not visible when being copied. 
86  buffer too small Out-of-range int 
myFunc86_buf_unconstrainedTopLevel(char 
*buf, const unsigned int bufSize, 
myStruct86 *ptr){ 
  unsigned int ind=0,upLim,idx; 
  if (buf == NULL || ptr == NULL) 
    ret=-1; 
  else{ 
    if (bufSize < 1) 
      ret=-2; 
    else { 
 ptr->elemNo = buf[ind]; 
      ind += 1; 
 upLim= ptr->elemNo; 
 if (upLim>LENGTH_86){ 
   ret=-3; 
   upLim=LENGTH_86; 
 } 
 idx=0; 
 while (upLim > idx){ 
A buffer is passed as pointer, in addition the size is passed as 
parameter. But both cannot be correlated at level on C language. 
A struct is passed as pointer into which the contents of buffer shall 
be inserted. It shall be checked whether the potential that the 
index of buffer may be out-of-range is recognised. 
. 
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   read4Byte_86(&buf[ind], 
                     &ptr->elem[idx]); 
 ind += 4; 
 idx++; 
    } 
  } 
  return ret; 
} 
87  buffer too small Out-of-range The example is too complex too provide pseudo code here. Only the description is given here. 
It shall be checked whether the potential that the index of buffer may be out-of-range is recognised as for example 
86. 
In addition, and this is the essential point here, it shall be checked whether a tool can recognise whether the reset of 
uplim1 to LENGTH_87 in case uplim1 is greatert than LENGTH_87 causes another defect: in the following loop only 
LENGTH_87 are read, while more elements may be stored there. Therefore the next step of idx2 starts at the wrong 
position, a the next element of myStruct87_1, while it expects elemNo_2. 
88  invalid pointer invalid index The example is too complex too provide pseudo code here. Only the description is given here. 
The capability to handle (nested) tables with different lenght of rows shall be checked. Indices into the tables are 
passed as parameters. Their values are derived from other tables. 
89  invalid pointer invalid index #define NAME_LENGTH_89 30 
int myFunc89(char *passedName){ 
   char name89[] = "/---------1-------" 
                   "--2---------3"; 
   int ind,ret=0; 
   ind = 0; 
   while((passedName[ind] != 0) &&  
         (ind <= sizeof(name89))) 
The length of a passed string (source buffer) shall be determinned 
in order to check whether it does fit into the destination buffer. 
A wrong termiantion condition for the loop over the source buffer 
causes an out-of-range condition if the length of the sourcer really 
exceeds the length of the destination. 
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    ind++; 
   if(ind == sizeof(name89)) 
     ret = -1; 
   else 
     strcpy(buf,passedName); 
   return ret; 
} 
Tab.  3-1: Fault Types 
 
3.2 Counter Examples 
Tab.  3-2 provides correct examples for some of the faults shown in Tab.  3-1, aiming to have code to proof that a tool does not report a fault. 
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1  Invisible 
Correlations 
Invisible 
Correlation 
between array 
and array length 
#define MAXLEN 128 
typedef struct TyMsg { 
  unsigned char msgLen; 
  char msgData[MAXLEN]; 
} TyMsg; 
char buf[MAXLEN]; 
void copyMsg(TyMsg* msg) { 
  memcpy(buf, 
         &msg->msgData[0], 
         msg->msgLen); 
} 
void processMessage() { 
  TyMsg msg; 
  msg.msgLen = rand() % (MAXLEN+1); 
  copyMsg(&msg); 
} 
In this context, processMessage honors the 
contract with copyMsg, according to which msgLen 
may only be in the range 0..MAXLEN. 
2  Ring Buffer 
handling 
 typedef struct{ 
   size_t source; 
   size_t length; 
} TyQueueEntry; 
 
TyQueueEntry queue[MAX_QUEUE_SIZE]; 
char buffer[MAX_BUF_SZ]; 
unsigned int head, tail; 
unsigned int full; 
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TyResult write_data(void* data, 
                    size_t data_len) 
{ 
  unsigned int start; 
  unsigned int space_avl; 
  TyResult     result; 
    
  if((head != tail) || full!=0) { 
     unsigned int last_index = 
       (head-1u) % MAX_QUEUE_SIZE; 
     start =  
       queue[last_index].source + 
       queue[last_index].length); 
  } else 
     start = 0u; 
   
  if((MAX_BUF_SZ-data_len)<start) 
     start = 0u; 
   
  if(head==tail && full==0) 
     space_avl = MAX_BUF_SZ; 
  else 
     space_avl = 
       (queue[tail].source – start) % 
       MAX_BUF_SZ; 
 
  if(space_avl >= data_len) 
  { 
. 
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    memcpy(&(buffer[start]), 
           data,data_len); 
    if(full==0) 
    { 
      queue[head].source = start; 
      queue[head].length = data_len; 
      head++; 
      if (head==MAX_QUEUE_SIZE) 
        head = 0; 
      if(head==tail) 
        full = 1; 
      result = ok_data_queued; 
    } 
    else 
      result = nok_queue_full; 
  } 
  else 
    result = nok_buffer_full; 
  return result; 
}      
3  Constant Array 
Compatibility 
 typedef int TyArray[10]; 
void func(const TyArray* a); 
TyArray b; 
func(&b); 
According to the C-Standard, the type of &b in the 
call to func is incompatible with the type declared for 
the single parameter of func (which is emitted as a 
warning, e.g., by gcc 4.7.2). 
The reason is that the declarator “const TyArray* 
a” does not declare a constant pointer to an array of 
int, but rather a pointer to an array of constant 
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integers (Clause 6.7.3, Paragraphs 5 and 9[1]). 
However, it is not clear why it should not be possible 
to use a pointer to a modifiable array in place of a 
pointer to a non-modifiable array. 
It should be noted that this is different from the case 
where, e.g., char* is passed for a const char* 
parameter, because the C-Standard only requires the 
unqualified versions of the types pointed to to be 
compatible (Clause 6.5.16.1, Paragraph 1[1]). Passing 
char** for a const char** parameter would thus 
again violate the constraints imposed by the language 
standard. 
4  Correct 
conditional 
return 
 int func(int a) { 
  if (a!=0) { 
    return 1; 
  } else { 
    return 0; 
  } 
} 
All branches contain a return statement, and there is 
none at the end of the function. However, as the end 
of the function cannot be reached, there is no 
condition under which the result can be undefined. 
5  Correct 
conditional 
initialisation 
 int func(int a) { 
  int ret; 
  if (a!=0) { 
    ret = 1; 
  } else { 
    ret = 0; 
  } 
All branches contain proper initialisation statements 
for ret, so that in any case, ret is defined before it is 
used. 
. 
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  return ret; 
} 
6  Fulfilled contract  File ctrlInit.c 
int ctrlArr[4]={1,1,1,0}; 
 
File ctrlVal.c 
extern int ctrlArr[]; 
int funcCreatePtr 
(char **ptr, int ind) { 
  if (ctrlArr [ind]) 
  { 
    *ptr=getStrPtr(); 
    return SUCCESS; 
  } else 
    return ERR; 
} 
 
File ctrlExec.c 
int funcCreatePtr(char** ptr, int ind); 
char *ptr=NULL; 
if (ERR==funcCreatePtr(&ptr,3)) 
  exit(99); 
else 
  strcpy(ptr,”xxx”); 
This is the correct implementation of Example 12. 
funcCreatePtr correctly returns SUCCESS only if 
*ptr is properly initialized. 
7  Correct length 
for memcpy 
 #define MAXLEN 128 
typedef struct TyMsg { 
  unsigned char msgLen; 
This is the correct implementation of Example 23. 
Here msgLen is of an unsigned integer type, and the 
length is checked to be in the proper range. 
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  char msgData[MAXLEN]; 
} TyMsg; 
TyMsg theMsg; 
char buf[MAXLEN]; 
void getMsg(TyMsg* msg); 
 
getMsg(&theMsg); 
memcpy(buf, 
       &theMsg.msgData[0], 
       theMsg.msgLen); 
8  Correct table 
termination 
 typedef struct { 
  unsigned char id1; 
  unsigned char id2; 
  ... 
} TyEntry; 
#define INVALID_ID 0xFF 
TyEntry pkttab[TABLEN]={ 
  {0,0,...}, 
  {0,0,...}, 
  {0,1,...}, 
  {1,0,...}, 
  {1,2,...}, 
  {1,2,...}, 
  {INVALID_ID,INVALID_ID,...} 
}; 
#define TABLEN 6 
unsigned int idx1 = 0; 
This is the correct implementation of Example 29. In 
this case, the table is correctly terminated. 
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unsigned int idx2 = 0; 
unsigned int idx3 = 0; 
unsigned char id1, id2; 
while(idx1<TABLEN) { 
  id1 = pkttab[idx1].id1; 
  id2 = INVALID_ID; 
  while((pkttab[idx2].id1== id1) && 
        (id2 != pkttab[idx2].id2)) { 
    id2 = pkttab[idx2].id2; 
 
    while((pkttab[idx3].id1 == id1) && 
          (id2 == pkttab[idx3].id2)) { 
      ...    
      idx3++;                
    } 
    idx2 = idx3; 
  } 
  idx1 = idx2; 
}       
9  File Handling Read valid data 
from file 
fgets(buf,BUFLEN,fd); 
div =atoi(buf); 
quot=100 / div; 
fgets(buf,BUFLEN,fd); 
ops  =(double)atof(buf); 
result   =sqrt(ops); 
Data read from file with valid values, counter example 
to 81 
 
10  Access out-of-
range array 
Invalid array 
length 
#define SIZE 500 
int i,j,arr[2*SIZE],result; 
Counter example to 21, the array size is doubled. 
The example is iterated in the source code for matters 
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for (i=0;i<SIZE;i++) 
  for (j=0;j<SIZE;j++) 
    result=arr[i+j]; 
of tool evaluation. 
Tab.  3-2: Suggestions for Non-Defects 
 
. 
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4. Aspects of Fault Type Classification 
The classification is guided by two aspects: 
• The mistake made by the programmer, e.g. the wrong thought, the typographical 
mistake or the violation of interface constraints, and 
• the method of detection. 
This means that faults are categorised separately if they differ by the kind of programmer’s 
mistake. A fault type may be further split up, if different fault detection methods can be 
conceived for otherwise similar faults represented by the type. 
In Ch. 4.1 aspects of classification in context of standards are discussed. Ch.4.2 provides a list of 
fault types aiming to harmonize messages from a number of tools. 
4.1 Relationship to Standards 
Theoretically, standards – such as the language standards – should be a natural source for a 
systematic classification of faults. The standards describe semantic constraints which define the 
admissibility of language and programming constructs, and any violation of these constraints 
could be considered a fault. 
However, neither do all faults result from a violation of the semantic constraints of the language, 
nor do all violations of semantic language constraints actually imply faults. 
For the first part of the proposition, it should be clear that not every valid program also conforms 
with functional and further non-functional requirements, so a valid program may very well 
contain faults. For an example, refer to Entry 68 in Tab.  3-1. Here, no semantic constraints of the 
language are violated, but still the result is wrong for all but one case. 
Tab.  3-2 contains examples for the second part of the proposition, most notably Entry 3. The 
language rules here are more strict than required for the situation, and thus any tool basing its 
decision on these language rules would report a fault here. 
On inspection, however, a software engineer would probably conclude that the situation is not 
critical and insert an explicit cast of the pointer passed as argument to silence the compiler and/or 
verification tool, without changing the observable behaviour of the code. 
Further, while in theory language standards should provide well-defined semantics for a 
language, in practice, this is seldomly the case, if at all. 
For example, the C Language Standard (ISO/IEC 9899[1]) distinguishes constraints from 
semantics, whereas constraints are statically verifiable properties, e.g. correspondence of types. 
Semantics mostly define the behaviour of the relevant language elements, such as expressions or 
statements, in terms of the state of the program during execution. 
Very often, the actual result, however, explicitly remains undefined. In some cases, this is because 
no useful definition can be given, such as in an array subscript expression, where the index given 
points beyond the last element of the array. 
. 
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In other cases, the lack of a definition is not as well-founded, such as in the case of converting an 
integer value to a type in which the value cannot be represented: 
• When converting to a signed integer type, the result is undefined. 
• When converting to an unsigned integer type, a definition is given in terms of modulo 
arithmetic, by repeatedly adding or subtracting the maximum representable value plus 
one until the result fits into the target type. 
In principle, a very similar definition could have been used for conversion to a signed integer type, 
with the added benefit of a more consistent language concept holding less surprises for a user of 
the language. 
Of course, compilers generate code for both operations which also provide a well-defined result, 
albeit that definition is now implementation-dependent instead of being standardised. Still, this 
implementation-based definition seems to be so widespread that programmers – not having read 
and understood the standard in detail – may even expect this to be the standard definition. 
Therefore this de-facto definition may very well be consistent with the software requirements, 
even though formally, the language standard declares the result to be undefined. 
These examples show that even on the basic level of language semantics, it is difficult to 
systematically derive fault classifications. The issue is even intensified by the fact that not all 
language standards are structured in a systematic manner. Definitions applying to a single 
operation may be widely dispersed over the standards document, so that the process of deriving 
the conditions for a fault as seen from the point of view of the standard may be very error-prone 
by itself and subject to omissions. 
4.2 Defect Types and Criticality Levels 
The contents of the following tables Tab.  4-1, Tab.  4-2 and Tab.  4-3 is based on assessments of 
tool reports and their harmonisation, introducing common terms for the reports considered as 
relevant. 
The text characterizing a defect issued by the tools differed considerably for the same defect type. 
Therefore a common set of defect types is defined. All relevant tool reports can be mapped 
uniquely onto this set. In future these defect types may replace the scheme (fault main type / fault 
subtype) as applied in Ch. 3. 
For the fault analysis the focus was put on fault types which are considered as relevant for the 
type of software analyzed: embedded space software. 20 such defect types were identified. 
To each such defect type a criticality level is assigned as shown in Tab.  4-1. 
Criticality 
Level 
Comment Examples 
Critical The defect type does impact the correctness of system operations if being 
activated, i.e. it manifests to an error or a failure. 
Division by zero 
NULL-ptr dererefence 
index out-of-bounds 
. 
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Warning The defect type highlights a possibly unintended operation in the source 
code which may, but not necessarily does manifest as  a critical defect. 
Invariant condition 
#define var 1 
if (var==0) 
Invariant expression 
int ii=0; 
… // no modification  
    //  of ii 
ii+=1; 
Unused result / return value 
ret=myFunc(); 
if (var<0) printf(“ERROR in”      
           “myFunc\n”); 
Uncritical The defect type is neither critical nor can it be considered a warning. violation of a lexical or layout 
rule or naming convention 
Tab.  4-1: Critcality Levels 
Level “critical” means that the defect compromises the system state in any case. Similarly, level 
“uncritical” means that such a defect does not compromise the system state in any case. 
Level “warning” indicates that the defect of this type may hint at a critical defect. However, the 
effect may just as well be intended or a simple oversight without leading to an error.  
The example on “return value not used” in Tab.  4-1 manifests as a defect which is of level 
“critical” because error handling cannot be activated due to the unintended mix of ret and var, 
while in other cases the return value may be dropped without any impact on the system state, 
then being classified as “uncritical”. 
Instead, the example on “redundant operation” is of type “uncritical” because the system state is 
not affected at all in this case. Here the report just indicates that the code could be optimized. In 
other cases code may be – unintentionally –missing which takes and modifies the value of ii 
before it is set again. In this case the level would be elevated to “critical”. 
The defect types are not necessarily orthogonal. The “non-terminating loop” as a result of static 
analysis is also covered by “timeout” which is a defect type from dynamic analysis, but covering 
more than defects of type “infinite loops”. 
. 
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Tab.  4-2 shows the common set of defect types together with the assigned criticality level. 
Defect Type Criticality Level 
Array Index Out-of-Bounds Critical 
Dereference of Invalid Pointer Critical 
Dereference of NULL-Pointer Critical 
File Access Error Critical 
Invalid function pointer Critical 
Non-terminating Loop Critical 
Passing invalid argument to standard library routine Critical 
(Possible) Recursion Critical 
Resource Leak Critical 
Undefined Result of Arithmetic Operation Critical 
Uninitialized Variable Critical 
Arithmetic Operation on NULL Pointer Warning 
Invariant Condition Warning 
Invariant Expression Warning 
Parameter Type Mismatch in Function Call Warning 
Timeout during execution Warning 
Unnecessary loop construct Warning 
Unreachable Code Warning 
Unused Result Warning 
Multiple return paths Uncritical 
Tab.  4-2:Common Set of Defect Types 
. 
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In Tab.  4-3 a description is given for defect types for which their meaning cannot be directly 
understood from its name. 
Defect Type Description Example 
Undefined Result of 
Arithmetic Operation 
An arithmetic operation is performed the result 
of which is undefined as per the language 
standard. For example, the result of a 
conversion from a signed integer to an 
unsigned integer type is undefined if the signed 
value does not fit into the unsigned type. 
unsigned int func(int a, int b) { 
  return (unsigned int)(a+b); 
} 
Arithmetic Operation 
on NULL Pointer 
A pointer is used for address calculation and its 
value is NULL. 
ptr=NULL; ind=5; 
myfunc(&ptr[ind]); 
Invariant Condition A condition in a logical expression is invariant. if ( 1== 0) 
if (a == 0 || a != 0) 
Invariant Expression An expression always yields the same result. ii=0; 
i+=1; // could be expressed by 
ii=1; 
Unnecessary loop 
construct 
A loop can be executed once only. #define LIMIT 1 
... 
unsigned int i; 
for (i=0;i<LIMIT;i++) { 
  ... 
} 
Multiple return paths There is more than one return-statement within 
a function. This is considered bad practice in 
structured programming because it complicates 
semantic analysis of the function itself and any 
code using it. 
if (a>=0) return a; 
else return –a; 
Tab.  4-3: Description of Some Defect Types 
. 
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5. Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Acronym Description 
BSSE Dr. Rainer Gerlich BSSE System and Software Engineering Immenstaad 
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt 
ECSS European Cooperation for Space Standardization 
OBSW On-Board Software 
SW Software 
tbc to be confirmed 
tbd to be defined 
 
 
 
 
 
 
